JUST WAR

Here's the shortened letter that First Things printed with Weigel's response to it in
Link: FT August/September 2004: Correspondence.

And Here's the full text:

To The Editor:
Leaving to the side for one moment several of George Weigel’s more questionable assertions concerning the specifics of the war in Iraq (for example the “strenuous efforts to secure Security Council approval for the use of armed force to vindicate Security Council resolutions”, which immediately call to mind the President's phrase “No matter what the whip count is, we're calling for a vote”), his account of the Just War Doctrine within a “theory of statecraft” in his rebuttal to Rowan Williams (“War and Statecraft: An Exchange,” March 2004) should occasion some comment even from those who supported the war on “self defense” grounds. First, the claim Weigel's analysis is fully “Thomistic” bears careful consideration, in particular his failure to distinguish properly between the “directive” and “executive” aspects of political prudence. Doubtless this observation will garner some derision as more of the same from “Thomists of the Strict Observance.” However, if the aim is to discover whether St. Thomas would have countenanced a preventative war such as we have just witnessed, a little strict observation of the Angelic Doctor would seem to be in order.
Weigel is quite right to question Dr. Williams's overly pacific account of the “presumption against war.” Basing such an argument in a “presumption against violence” is clearly difficult to reconcile with the Thomistic and Augustinian analysis, which emphasizes the liceity of such coercion to duly constituted authority, as Weigel observes (“even as it undermines. . .”). Nevertheless, in distinguishing a “presumption against war” (or as Weigel had previously phrased it, a “presumption for peace”) from a “presumption against violence,” one seems inevitably drawn to the conclusion that the phrase has more weight than Weigel end up assigning it (in his account of the calculus leading to the determination that war “is the only responsible option."). And not the least reason for this conclusion is Pope John Paul II’s recent remarks on war and peace. For the phrase is a useful emblem of the concept of war as a “last resort”—that war is not simply one among many options available to “statecraft,” but as the Holy Father emphasized in the run up to Iraq: “war cannot be decided upon, even when it is a matter of ensuring the common good, except as the very last option. . .” (Address to the Diplomatic Corps, Jan. 13, 2003).
As might be expected this notion of war as the last option comports very well with the characterization of the “last resort” criterion in Gaudium et Spes (GS, 79), and The Catechism of the Catholic Church (sec. 2309). What might be more surprising, however, is that the Catechism’s formulation of war as a “last resort” also fits equally well with the 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia's analysis of the issue: “a clear title is limited to the condition that war is necessary as a last appeal.” The Catholic Encyclopedia's emphasis here is signal, because it militates against the argument that the “last resort” criterion, strictly understood, is a new, or developed, analysis.
The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia’s analysis is indisputably a Thomistic analysis, specifically because that analysis proceeds from St. Thomas’s injunction that just war must aim at peace, nor can peace be “sought” as a pretext for war (ST IIaIIae, q. 40, a.1, repl. 3d obj.). Indeed, in Weigel’s own 1987 book Tranquilitas Ordinis he seems to acknowledge this (p. 41, bullets D, E-1,2,3), and concur that the “last” in “last resort” must mean “last.” St. Thomas’s further delimitation that even a war fought for a just cause can be rendered unjust (ST IIaIIae, q. 40, a.1, cont.) by illicit motives (revenge, a lust for domination) only supports the arguments from the Vatican, the Catechism, and the Catholic Encyclopedia that the “primary title” to war is a defense against aggression (extant or imminent) and the redress of wrongs (ulciscuntur iniurias) which can be extended vicariously under strict conditions. The analogy St. Thomas uses to elaborate this dynamic is particularly revealing: the public authority is empowered to defend the “common weal” by armed force (“rempublicam . . . ab exterioribus hostibus.” ST IIaIIae, q. 40, a. 1, cont.) as it is empowered to use capital punishment to defend the “common weal” against internal threats. The “punitive” title to war, consequent to an actual injury, would seem to be the only positive (not immediately defensive) title to war, and thus the only one even remotely corresponding to the justification of “advancing” the good. And in this regard it is interesting to note that the only examples of “positive” action here (bonum promoveatur) are likened to the state's coercive power to “rescue the poor” (eripite pauperem).
Based on some of his writings one wonders the degree of latitude Mr. Weigel would be comfortable affording to the coercive power of the public authority in wielding the sword to “rescue” the poor. And this is the paradoxical element to Weigel’s remarks on the subject of war, because while he very strictly circumscribes the public authority’s role in “coercing” economic activity toward the end of “promoting” the common good, he seems to envision more latitude for that authority with regard to “advancing” the international common good. Dr. Williams’s discussion of coercion by the public authority, while I believe inadequate in certain areas, points to some very real difficulties in Weigel’s analysis in this area. Dr. Williams cites Thomistic doctrine to support his point “that coercion is simply not to be justified unless it is answerable to a clear account of common human good.” Here I would say Dr. Williams’s emphasis belongs on the word “common” because that is the real difficulty with Weigel’s analysis of political prudence. To pursue the “punitive” title to war requires in particular a view to advancing the “common good” of humanity, because it regards a distributive rather than simply commutative judgment, and requires that the “prudence” of the authority entrusted with that task look to the interest of not only one nation, but all nations. Thus the prudence required would be more directive than executive in function (ST, IIaIIae, q. 50, a.1). And from the preceding discussion of the “last” resort criterion, we can see that this title is primarily an operation of executive prudence, since it is for the most part the necessary execution of the rulers obligation to defend his people.
Thus, in assessing the “prudential judgment” (prudens iudicium) required to determine whether we have arrived at the “last resort” with regard to the strict defense of an individual nation and its private good, we must distinguish from the “prudential judgment” and correlative “common good” involved in “advancing” the “common good” of the community of nations. Certainly the leader of a nation’s subjective consideration of the security exigencies for his own nation suffices to satisfy for the strict “last resort” criterion, provided the judgment meets the Thomistic stipulation of “right reason.” But whether the “prudential judgment” of the leader of one nation in “advancing” the cause of the common good in respect to the community of nations comprehends the employment of war to that end seem irreconcilable with the understanding of directive prudence as we understand it from St. Thomas. I would say that this is why the Holy Father chose the moment of the war to emphasize that “war is never just another means that one can choose to employ for settling differences between nations.” Now it is precisely the role of political prudence (or in Thomas's formulation, regnative and political prudence) to choose between “many options” for promoting or “advancing” the “common good”—what is meant by the distinction between directive and executive prudence (ST, IIaIIae, q. 50, a. 1, repl 1st obj.). This is where Dr. Williams’ citation of the passages on “violence” are so illustrative, because they clearly demonstrate that coercion belongs solely to the authority charged with the particular common good in question (domestic, national, international) and the virtue of prudence obtains or is exercised in virtue of that authority being constituted in regard to the requisite end.
More could be said here regarding the claim that “war” forms a part of statecraft. Thomas takes as his starting point for the analysis of “statecraft” Aristotle's division of prudence in Ethics VI.8. Thomas thus divides public prudence (by which he means prudence directed to the “Common Good”) into “regnative, political, and domestic” (ST IIaIIae, q. 47, a. 1; ST IIaIIae, q. 50, a.1-4). Military prudence is reckoned a species of prudence alongside “regnative, political, and domestic” prudence in Thomas’s discussion of the “subjective” specification of prudence (prudence as specified by its application). The specific difference is that military business is “contained under” (sub politico) political affairs, as regards specifically the repulsion of external attacks (IIaIIae, q. 50, a. 4), and thus falls more under the aspect of the executive rather than the directive (regnative) operation of prudence. But to go into this more would require an even more extensive analysis of prudence and justice.
What all this argues against is the idea, again admirably summarized above by the Holy Father, of including war among the discretionary “tools” of statecraft. Clearly the means of war are at the disposal of public authorities to defend the security of a nation (clearly part of a proper common good to a nation). But it is hoped that what is also clear from the above is that in pursuit of the international common good, war is not numbered among the tools available to particular public authorities, particularly not without a rigorous clarification of the international common good, again as Dr. Williams observes: “The point is that coercion is simply not to be justified unless it is answerable to a clear account of common . . . good.” (emphasis changed). So while Weigel is right to resist Dr. Williams’s pacificism, and Dr. Williams right to emphasize in this context, “the need for a ruler or government to be exposed to assessment by larger standards of the human good than national interest”, both seem to share the error that (as Dr. Williams puts it) “war as a moral option [is] a tool for the promotion of specific social goods.” War is the last option for the defense of the specific good of (individual) national security. However without a shared vision of the “human” good which regards man’s ultimate end, by a duly constituted authority regarding that end, war will always be restricted to the service of specific goods of individual (and vicarious) national security. It is also hoped that what has been adduced above is sufficient to suggest a clarification to the notion of “statecraft,” not as a techne aimed at an object (even if that object is tranquilitas ordinis), but as a natural virtue of thought (Ethics, VI.4-8), which is specified in operation in virtue of those objects proper to it. For that tranquility of order cannot be produced by the antagonism of opposing forces, nor even ultimately by the expertise of a politician, but rather by the prudential (regnative and political, i.e. executive) realization of that order by properly established authority, an establishment that accounts for (and indeed comprises) the “legitimacy” of that authority in the use of coercion, (rather than any “justification” based in a techne).
So back to Iraq: if Iraq is like Afghanistan, and has “refus[ed] to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects” (ST IIaIIae, q. 40, a.1) including wrongs to security, then we may indeed at the point where war is the “last” option. However, if Iraq is deemed to be an opportunity for “war as a moral option [as] a tool for the promotion of specific social goods”, I believe to place ourselves with St. Thomas we have to defer to the Holy Father’s distinguishing of war as not an option, but a failure of statecraft.
Sincerely,

Comments

[Ronny]

Al,

There is a lot in this letter to unpack, and I'll confess not immediately seeing the connection between your post on Mark's blog about the disparity between killing in capital punishment, private self defense and war.

As I understand you, you are observing (again on Mark's blog) that justifiable killing is permitted by Aquinas on qualitatively different grounds depending on the situation. For capital punishment (provided the sentence is just), Aquinas believes that it is possible to directly intend the death of the criminal provided that the executioner refers his intention to the public good. In private self defense, however, one cannot directly intend the death of his attacker, but rather if in using proportionate force to repel the attacker the death of the attacker comes about as a secondary effect, then the one attacked has not himself sinned.

In war, however, the issue is complicated by how Aquinas both refers to it being a punitive action and self defense. Is killing in war, then, directly intended as a punitive action decreed by the proper authority, or is it more akin to self defense and thus the killing is a secondary effect of repelling the attacker?

Assuming that I have summarized the problem that you raise on Mark's blog, then I gather that you are suggesting that the way to sort out what is happening here is to analyze under what species of prudence justice is being executed in these three situations.

Are we on the same page?

[al]

Ronny,
Absolutely, and if you look to the section on prudence, you'll see Aquinas identifies a martial prudence alongside regnative and directive.

[Chris Sullivan]

The problem with St Thomas's train of thought is that it lead him to write this :-

"As for heretics, their sin deserves banishment, not only ... by excommunication, but also from this world by death. To corrupt the faith, whereby the soul lives, is much graver than to counterfeit money, which supports temporal life. Since forgers and other malefactors are summarily condemned to death by the civil authorities, with much more reason may heretics as soon as they are convicted of heresy be not only excommunicated, but also justly be put to death."

quoted in www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/FK23Aa01.html

The execution of heretics is so clearly outside what the Church now teaches is licit (or ever was licit) that it raises the question of whether the very idea that killing can be justified by the state is actually valid.

Those who draw the sword ought to be very careful because scripture repeatedly says "all who draw the sword will die by the sword", a warning repeated by Christ.

God Bless

[Ronny]

Alright, I outline below the different species of prudence that I found Aquinas identifying in the treatise on prudence (relying heavily here upon Q. 47, art. 11 and Q. 48, art. 1).

Species of prudence differ according to their ends.

A. When directed to an individual's private good, it is prudence simply (prudentia simpliciter).

B. When it is directed to the common good, it is further divided according to the various kinds of multitude.
1. The first kind is a multitude united for a particular purpose, such as an army. An army is governed by military prudence (prudentia militaris).
2. The second kind is a multitude united for the whole of life, such as a home or family. A home is governed by domestic prudence (prudentia oeconomica).
3. The third kind of multitude is the city or kingdom. Its ruling principle is regnative prudence (prudentia regnativa) in the king and political prudence (prudentia politica) in the subject.

I'm using here the terms that appear in the Dominican Fathers' translation, but I've noted the actual Latin used in the text for each of these.

I am a little confused about whence you are getting the terms "directive" and "executive." Given your last comment, I take it that by "directive" you are referring to political prudence, and by "executive" you mean regnative prudence.

Sorry to labor over these preliminary distinctions, but I think that they are necessary in make sure that we are talking about the same species of prudence.

[al]

Ronny,
Directive and executive come from the analysis of the administration of public justice.

[mark]

Wouldn't Weigel claim that all "right-reasoning" nations are already in agreement on the "international common good" re: human rights violations--and so, in view of a negligent international authority (as the U.S. would no doubt claim the U.N. to be), someone's got to step up to the plate and save those oppressed Iraqis (all other options having been tried)? Or is it the case that no one else can do the U.N.'s job, as an individual nation is only authorized to use force in order to defend its OWN subjects? What if there were no U.N., or any body that could claim as its jurisdiction the international community? In such a case would the U.S. have had the right to overthrow Saddam the Tyrant? Or would the U.N. (or something like it), not already existing, have to be invented in order for such force to be justified?

[mark]

Re: the "punitive" title to war, I like that you identify this as falling under the heading of "advancing the common good" (I like your tweak of Weigel here as well). If I understand you, this is something like the rationale for forceful self-defense: What is aimed at is not evil (killing) but the good--i.e., its preservation, or, in the face of a perennial hostile force, the advancement of the good over and against that force, even unto its annihilation (as opposed to the mere repulsion of yet another attack by that force). But the question remains: If it isn't you being (perennially) attacked, are you justified in "stepping in with force?"

I can imagine someone like Weigel saying: Aren't I (the U.S.) allowed to save someone from being mugged (oppressed), even without the permission of the jurisdictional authority (the U.N.)--again, presuming all other things that could be tried have been (including trying to get the U.N. to act, as the U.S. would say they have)?

But what I'm wondering is: Given that war is such a gross means of accomplishing anything, can it really, prudentially speaking, be anything other than a means to accomplishing the grossest of ends, e.g., stopping attack/destruction of hostile force (in other words, forget about "statecraft," this is about BLOWING EVERYTHING UP)? And even then do you not have to have the grossest sort of violations of human dignity, both in magnitude and in quality, for war to be proportionate (once again, presuming that ALL OTHER ALTERNATIVES that could be pursued have been)?

I just don't think that Saddam, as bad as he was, was as gross a threat to humanity as this, not even in his pursuit of WMD (hey, everybody's doing it)...esp. in view of the fact that WE, as huge as we are and therefore as relatively unnecessary to us as they are, STILL HAVE THEM AT THE READY...

[mark]

"Albert Gunn will, I trust, recognize that the essay that occasioned Dr. Williams’ response (and my subsequent response to that) was not an exercise in Thomistic textual exegesis. Rather, it was an effort to apply the moral logic of classic just war theory to our present circumstances. In part, my aim was to bridge the gap that had emerged over the past two generations between just war thinking and a morally rigorous theory of statecraft; for more on this topic, see my more recent First Things essay, “World Order: What Catholics Forgot” (May). This gap is, if I may use the phrase, thoroughly un-Thomistic. Moreover, I believe this gap has something to do with the so-called “presumption against war,” an intellectual move that tends to reduce just war thinking to a casuistry of means in which the question of obligatory political ends is rather marginalized."

If you're going to appeal to St. Thomas, pal, Thomistic exegesis is PRECISELY what is called for! And hadn't you, Mr. Gunn, already dismissed the bugaboo of the "presumption against war" as irrelevant?? And how could "world order" be something that Catholics (i.e., those who articulated and defended "classic just war thinking") "forgot"?? Such a thing (such a CONCEPT) never existed prior to this century!! The "gap" that has "emerged" between the Church and Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger and their ilk CAN'T be bridged--at least not without drastic revision (forget "application") of the tradition--but then, that's just what neo-cons like Weigel do all the time!

What a mediocre thinker this guy is. I could hear his irritating nasal drawl as I read these words.